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This report looks at the impact of the coronavirus crisis on the health, economy and labour 
market of older industrial Britain.  It brings together a wide range of official statistics to plug a  
key gap in the evidence base. 
  
The evidence is arranged in three parts.  The first is a review of the situation just prior to 
the start of the pandemic.  This is important because much of older industrial Britain 
started off lagging behind and the UK government had made a commitment to ‘levelling up’ 
the regions.  The evidence shows that: 
 
• Older industrial towns and the former coalfields entered the pandemic with an older 
and less healthy population, at higher risk from the virus 
 
• The employment rate in older industrial Britain was well below the national average.  
To match the rate in the prosperous South East for example, 580,000 more residents 
of older industrial towns would have had to be in work. 
 
• In older industrial towns there were only 66 jobs per 100 residents of working age, 
and only 57 per 100 in the former coalfields 
 
• Output (GVA) per job in older industrial towns was 16 per cent lower than the 
national average 
 
• Between 2012 and 2019, job growth in older industrial towns and the former 
coalfields was slower than the national average, and far behind London 
 
• There had been progress in bringing down unemployment in the cities, towns and 
communities of older industrial Britain but large numbers remained out-of-work on 
incapacity benefits 
 
The second part of the evidence examines the impact of the coronavirus on public 
health: 
 
• Over the whole pandemic up to the start of 2021, the rate of confirmed infections in 
older industrial Britain was on average10-20 per cent above the UK average 
 
• Also up to the start of 2021, the cumulative death rate in older industrial towns and 
the former coalfields was on average 30 per cent above the UK average 
 
• Reflecting the local mix of industries, the opportunities for working from home have 
been more limited in older industrial Britain than for example in London, leading to 





The third part of the evidence covers the impact on the economy and labour market of 
older industrial Britain: 
 
• During the first national lockdown around a third of employees in older industrial 
Britain were furloughed – roughly the same proportion as across the country as a 
whole.  The proportion fell to around 6-8 per cent as the economy reopened in the 
summer and early autumn. 
 
• If a third of those who remained furloughed at the end of October (before the 
introduction of further restrictions) eventually lose their jobs there will be an extra 
230,000 redundancies in older industrial towns 
 
• Between February and November 2020, claimant unemployment rose by 310,000 in 
older industrial towns, 100,000 in the former coalfields and 140,000 in the main 
regional cities 
 
• Over the year to November 2020, claimant unemployment among 16-24 year olds in 
older industrial Britain roughly doubled 
 
• By late 2020, the economic downturn had pushed up the numbers on out-of-work 
benefits across older industrial Britain to almost one-in-six of all adults of working 
age, and in some local authorities to as high as 20 per cent. 
 
• Reflecting falling incomes and low wages, the number of men and women receiving 
Universal Credit as an in-work top-up has also doubled since the start of the 
pandemic 
 
In effect, the downturn has wiped out ten years’ progress in the economy of older industrial 
Britain.  The increase in claimant unemployment since February 2020 already exceeds the 
whole of the reduction during the long recovery from the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
The report concludes that on a wide range of social and economic indicators, older industrial 
Britain entered the crisis lagging behind.  In older industrial Britain the economic and labour 
market damage from the downturn has been substantial and as the crisis finally recedes 
older industrial Britain will still lag behind the rest of the country.  
 
That there is a need to build a national economic recovery is indisputable, but it is also vitally 















The evidence gap 
 
The coronavirus crisis is far from over but with vaccines finally coming into use there is at 
least the prospect of an end to the pandemic.  This is therefore a good moment to take stock 
of the impact of the crisis. 
 
In terms of infections, deaths and damage to the national economy the impacts are well 
documented.  However, beyond the data on public health the impacts of the crisis on 
different parts of the country are less well understood.  In particular, there has so far been 
remarkably little hard evidence on the economic and labour market impacts on different 
places. 
 
This evidence gap matters because before the crisis the UK was already a highly unequal 
country, with some regions and local areas lagging well behind others in terms of prosperity, 
well-being and life chances.  Indeed, the government led by Boris Johnson had made 
repeated commitments to ‘level up’ the economy.  Quite what has happened during the 
coronavirus crisis has remained unclear.  Has the crisis narrowed these local and regional 
disparities or, as some believe, has it widened them even further? 
 
This report helps fill the evidence gap.  It looks specifically at older industrial Britain – a large 
swathe of the country that was lagging behind prior to the crisis and one that could 
reasonably expect to be the prime target of any levelling-up agenda.  Drawing on official 
statistics, the main body of the report is organised in three parts: 
 
SECTION 2 looks at where older industrial Britain started prior to the crisis, 
documenting the disadvantage in terms of health, jobs, incomes and unemployment.  
 
SECTION 3 focusses on the public health crisis itself, looking at how older industrial 
Britain has been affected compared to other parts of the country. 
 
SECTION 4 examines the impact of the crisis on the economy and labour market of 
older industrial Britain. 
 






Older industrial Britain 
 
In order to bring to bear statistics on the impact of the crisis we first need a working definition 
of ‘older industrial Britain’.  Most people have a notion of what constitutes this part of the 
country – the places where the industrial revolution started and where much of the original 
industry has now disappeared or shrunk to a fraction of its former self  – but there is no off-
the-peg official definition. 
 
In this report we use three overlapping definitions: 
 
 OLDER INDUSTRIAL TOWNS 
These are the places where industries such as coal, steel, chemicals, engineering 
and textiles have shed large numbers of jobs over the years.  Here we use a list of 91 
local authorities in the Midlands, North, Scotland and Wales that has been deployed 
in previous academic research1.  Some of the towns covered by these local 
authorities are actually substantial cities and others are quite small but the list 
excludes the main regional cities.  In 2019 the local authorities covering older 




This is a distinctive part of older industrial Britain.  Most of the former coalfields are 
included within the definition of ‘older industrial towns’ but they also extend into a 
number of other areas, for example in Northumberland and Kent.  We use a detailed 
ward-based definition of the former coalfields that has previously been deployed in a 
number of studies3.  Where necessary, because of data availability, we also use a list 
of the principal coalfield local authorities.  In 2019 the former coalfields, defined at 
ward level, had a combined population of 5.8 million, or 9 per cent of the GB total. 
 
 MAIN REGIONAL CITIES 
These are the ten main cities in the Midlands, North, Scotland and Wales4.  They are 
all older industrial to some extent but they have always played a wider role in local 
economies and are therefore worth differentiating from older industrial towns or the 
former coalfields.  These cities have long been service centres for their hinterlands, 
administrative headquarters, transport hubs for their regions and home to major 
universities.  On the whole, they were therefore never quite as reliant on the older 
industries that have now shrunk or disappeared.  In 2019 the main regional cities, 
defined by their local authorities, had a combined population of 5.7 million, or 9 per 
cent of the GB total. 
  
 
1 See in particular C Beatty and S Fothergill (2020) ‘Recovery or stagnation: Britain’s older industrial 
towns since the recession’, Regional Studies, vol 54, pp. 1238-1249. 
2 Source: ONS mid-year population estimates 
3 Most recently C Beatty, S Fothergill and T Gore (2019) The State of the Coalfields 2019, CRESR, 
Shef field Hallam University. 
4 Birmingham, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle upon Tyne, 




Because there is substantial overlap between the definitions of former coalfields and older 
industrial towns the population figures here should not be added together.  Overall, however, 
around 23 million people live in one or other of these areas – just over a third of the GB 
population. 
 
Where we present averages for older industrial towns, the former coalfields or the main 
regional cities they are based on these definitions, details of which are presented in the 
appendix.  A number of tables also present local figures that include additional local 
authorities that in part cover smaller older industrial areas falling outside these definitions. 
 
For comparison we also present: 
 
• Figures for London, because it is such a large component of the UK (population just 
under 9 million in 2019) and because until the crisis it was widely understood to be 
the most dynamic part of the country 
 
• Figures for South East England (population 9.2 million in 2019) defined at here 
regional level and excluding London.  This part of the country is often regarded as 
the most consistently prosperous part of the UK, lacking the substantial deprivation 
found in parts of London, and often illustrates what is achievable in a strong regional 
economy 
 
• The average for Great Britain as a whole (or occasionally for the UK, which also 

















Health and well being 
 
Much of older industrial Britain has a population skewed towards the groups that have 
proved vulnerable to the virus.  One of the things that quickly became apparent is that the 
new coronavirus, Covid-19, presents a greater risk to older people and to those with pre-
existing health problems.  They are more likely to experience acute symptoms, more likely to 
be hospitalised and more likely to die. 
 
The over-65s account for around one-in-five of the population in older industrial towns and 
the former coalfields.  Although this proportion is only a little higher than the GB average and 
similar to the proportion in South East England, it is well ahead of the proportion in the main 
regional cities (one-in-seven) or in London (one-in-eight). 
 
     Population aged 65+, 2019 (%) 
 
 Former coalfields    20.0 
 South East England    19.5 
 Older industrial towns   19.1 
 GB average     18.6 
 Main regional cities    13.8 
 London     12.1 
 
 Source: ONS mid-year population estimates 
 
The high proportion of over-65s in the population of older industrial towns and the former 
coalfields, compared to the cities, hasn’t arisen because people live longer in this part of the 
country.  The opposite is actually the case: in the former coalfields, for example, average life 
expectancy is a year less than the national average and two to three years less than in 
South East England5.  The high proportion of over 65s is principally the result of migration by 
younger people to places where educational and employment opportunities are more 
plentiful.  And unlike parts of South East England, Britain’s older industrial towns and former 
coalfields do not attract much of an inflow of affluent retirees. 
 
Across the whole adult population of older industrial Britain, more than a third report health 
conditions or illnesses lasting more than 12 months.  This translates into 4.9 million people in 
older industrial towns, 1.8 million in the former coalfields and 1.6 million in the main regional 
cities.  These are vast numbers, and many are the men and women who have faced the 
highest risk of serious ill health or death arising from the virus.  A smaller proportion of 
London’s population – just 28 per cent – falls into this high-risk group. 
 
 




% of residents aged 16+ reporting health problems lasting 
                  more than 12 months, 2019 
 
 Former coalfields*    38 
 South East England    37 
 Older industrial towns   36 
 Main regional cities    35 
 GB average     35 
 London     28 
 
 Source: APS 
 *Local authority-based definition 
 
The incidence of poor health and/or disability is even clearer in the numbers claiming 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA) or its replacement Personal Independence Payment (PIP), 
which is currently being phased in.  DLA and PIP are welfare benefits paid to help offset the 
costs of care and/or mobility arising from disability.  Among the working age population, 
DLA/PIP is claimed by individuals both in work and out-of-work and it is also paid to 
substantial numbers above state pension age. 
 
 DLA/PIP claimant rate, February 2020 
       (as % of total population) 
 
 Former coalfields    8.6 
 Older industrial towns   8.0 
 Main regional cities    7.2 
 GB average     6.0 
 London     4.6 
 South East England    4.5 
 
 Sources: DWP, ONS 
 
In February 2020, 8 per cent of the entire population of Britain’s older industrial towns (or 
1,342,000 people) and nearer 9 per cent (496,000) of the population of the former coalfields 
were DLA or PIP claimants.  These proportion were far higher than the GB average and 




Jobs and business 
 
The coronavirus crisis has disrupted business, destroyed jobs and lowered national income 
by more than any recession in modern times.  These economic impacts have been felt in all 
parts of the country but some local economies started off far behind others.  Th is is 







The ‘employment rate’ – the share of adults of working age in employment – is a widely used 
indicator but the large number of students in higher education can be an important distortion.  
The number of students has been increasing and they are concentrated in the big cities and 
a number of university towns where they lower the overall employment rate.  By comparison, 
there are few higher educational institutions in older industrial towns or the former coalfields.  
The best measure is therefore the employment rate excluding economically inactive 
students6. 
 
Employment rate (%) of 16-64 year olds, excluding students, 2019 
 
 South East England    83.4 
 GB average     80.3 
 London     80.1 
 Older industrial towns   77.5 
 Former coalfields*    77.5 
 Main regional cities    77.2 
 
 Source: APS 
 *Local authority-based definition 
 
Excluding students, the employment rate in older industrial Britain prior to the pandemic was 
six percentage points behind the level in South East England and more than three 
percentage points behind the GB average.  Or to put this another way, to match the 
employment rate (excluding students) in South East England: 
 
• In older industrial towns, an extra 580,000 residents of working age would have 
had to be in work. 
 
• In the former coalfields, an extra 200,000 residents of working age would have 
had to be in work. 
 
• In the main regional cities, an extra 210,000 residents of working age would have 
had to be in work 
 
These figures provide a good measure of the employment shortfall in older industrial Britain 
before the crisis.  Even to match the GB average employment rate (excluding students) the 
increases in employment would have had to be 280,000, 95,000 and 105,000 respectively in 
each of these areas. 
 
A widespread assumption is that the quality of jobs has declined, especially in less 
prosperous parts of the country, with much of the growth in employment since the financial 
crisis skewed towards part-time and insecure working, including debased forms of self-
employment.  The proliferation of ‘self-employed’ delivery workers and taxi drivers, for 








Prior to the crisis, in 2019, self -employment accounted for 12 per cent of all jobs in older 
industrial towns, 12 per cent in the former coalfields and 13 per cent in the main regional 
cities7.  These shares represent substantial numbers and in older industrial towns the share 
rose by around one percentage point after 2010 on top of  a one percentage point increase 
between 2000 and 20108.  However, self-employment in older industrial Britain remained 
lower than in London (18 per cent) or the national average (14 per cent).  Part-time working, 
at 24 per cent of all jobs in older industrial towns and the former coalfields and 25 per cent in 
the main regional cities, was broadly in line with the national average9. 
 
The extent of zero-hours contracts is harder to pin down and there is no local data.  A 
government survey of businesses put the national figure for 2017 at 1.8 million10 and since 
2010 the numbers recorded by the government’s Labour Force Survey have risen sharply, 
though the Office for National Statistics (ONS) takes the view that part of the observed 
increase appears to be due to increased recognition and awareness of this form of 
employment.  Likewise, there is no readily available local data on workers in temporary 
employment or with second jobs.  Across the UK as a whole, 4 per cent of workers have 
second jobs and 5 per cent are in temporary employment11. 
 
The weakness of the labour market in much of older industrial Britain prior to the pandemic 
is clearer in the data on ‘job density’ – the ratio between the number of jobs12 and the local 
working age population.  In 2019, prior to the pandemic, Britain’s older industrial towns had 
just 66 jobs for every 100 adults of working age and in the former coalfields the figure was 
only 57 per 100.  Both figures were well behind the national average. 
 
Number of jobs in area per 100 residents of working age, 2019 
 
 London     89 
 Main regional cities    86 
 South East England    77 
 GB average     77 
 Older industrial towns   66 
 Former coalfields    57 
 




7 Source: Annual Population Survey (APS) 
8 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2018) The Contemporary Labour Market in Britain’s Older Industrial 
Towns, CRESR. Sheffield Hallam University. 
9 Source: APS 
10 See Office for National Statistics (2018) Contracts that do not guarantee a minimum number of 
hours: April 2018, ONS, London. 
11 Source: APS 
12 The Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) data used here includes employees and 
the self -employed (excepting those not registered for VAT or PAYE).  This differs from the data 




Older industrial towns and the former coalfields are integral parts of complex networks of 
commuting, particularly into neighbouring cities, which helps explain their low job density.  
However, it is hard to escape the conclusion that one of the main reasons why so many 
people commuted out of older industrial towns and the coalfields is that there were not 
enough jobs in the places where they live. 
 
Local f igures on Gross Value Added (GVA) per head – a key indicator for a government 
aiming to level-up the economy – are influenced by commuting patterns because production 
is recorded where people work, not where they live.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, prior to the 
pandemic GVA per head in Britain’s older industrial towns came in at just 70 per cent of the 
national average and in the former coalfields at just 67 per cent.  In the main regional cities, 
the net inflow of commuters meant that GVA per head was above the national average 
 
    Productivity (GVA) 2018, UK=100 
      Per head Per job 
 
 London        177      141 
 South East England       107      106 
 UK average        100      100 
 Main regional cities       111        92 
 Older industrial towns        70        84 
 Former coalfields*         67        84 
 
 Source: ONS 
 *Local authority-based definition 
 
Expressing GVA in relation to the number of jobs in each part of the country changes this 
picture.  On this measure older industrial towns and the former coalfields were not quite so 
far behind – they both came in at 84 per cent of the national average – and the main 
regional cities slipped to below average. 
 
Both sets of figures, and especially those on GVA per job which are a more meaningful 
guide, suggest that older industrial Britain has a ‘productivity problem’.   The reality is more 
complex.  Local figures on GVA per job reflect the mix of industries, the mix of occupations 
and the number of hours worked as well as the efficiency of production.  In practice, much of 
older industrial Britain has a mix of industries and occupations skewed towards lower-grade, 
low value-added work, which lowers figures on GVA per job.  The underlying differences in 
‘efficiency’ are actually much smaller than the differences in GVA per job13 
 
 
13 See C Beatty and S Fothergill (2019) Local Productivity: the real differences across UK cities and 








The government’s Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) shows that , prior to the 
pandemic, hourly earnings in older industrial towns and the former coalfields were on 
average eight per cent below the national average and only around three-quarters of the 
level in London. 
 
  Median gross hourly earnings of residents in full-time work, 2019, GB=100 
     Men   Women 
 
 London    123      125 
 South East England   112      105 
 GB average    100      100 
 Main regional cities     95        96 
 Older industrial towns    92        92 
 Former coalfields*     92        91 
 
 Source: ASHE 
 *Local authority-based definition 
 
Prior to the pandemic, a total of 6.8 million jobs were located in Britain’s older industrial 
towns and 2.0 million in the former coalfields (an overlapping geography)14.  Employment in 
older industrial towns and the former coalfields had been growing but at a much slower rate 
than in the cities. 
 
       Increase in employee jobs, 2012-2019 
     as % of jobs     as % of pop. aged 16-64 
 
 London         16.0      12.3 
 Main regional cities        10.7        8.3 
 GB average         10.4        7.2 
 South East England          9.5        6.7 
 Older industrial towns         6.9        4.2 
 Former coalfields          7.5        4.0 
 
 Source: BRES 
 
Expressed in relation to the stock of jobs, the job growth between 2012 and 2019 in older 
industrial towns and in the former coalfields was respectable, at around seven per cent, 
though less than in London and the main regional cities.  In relation to the resident working 
age population – a better indicator of local labour demand – the rate of job growth in older 
industrial towns and the former coalfields was far less impressive – only around one-third of 








Worklessness and benefits 
 
Despite interventions by the Treasury and Bank of England to support the economy, the 
coronavirus crisis has led to a surge in unemployment and growing reliance on welfare 
benefits. 
 
Unemployment has long been a significant feature of older industrial Britain , which is hardly 
surprising given the scale of job loss over the years.  Nevertheless, the prolonged period of 
economic growth from 1993 to 2007 and then the sustained if unspectacular recovery after 
the 2008 financial crisis did much to lower levels of worklessness.  Between 2010 and 2018 
the numbers out-of-work on unemployment benefits across Britain halved – a reduction of 
around 230,000 in older industrial towns, 80,000 in the former coalfields and 90,000 in the 
main regional cities. 
 
In February 2020, immediately prior to the pandemic, claimant unemployment across Great 
Britain as a whole stood at 1.26 million15.  A second measure, from the government’s Labour 
Force Survey16, pointed to 1.3 million unemployed. 
 
         Claimant count unemployment, February 2020 
(as % of economically active 16-64 yr. olds) 
 
 Main regional cities    5.9 
 Older industrial towns   5.1 
 Former coalfields    4.7 
 London     3.9 
 GB average     3.9 
 South East England    2.9 
 
 Sources: DWP, APS 
 
At this point, claimant unemployment rates in older industrial Britain were higher than the 
national average though, at around 5 per cent, they were low by historical standards.  In 
Britain’s older industrial towns as a whole 405,000 people were claimant unemployed at this 
stage, 126,000 in the former coalfields and 166,000 in the main regional cities.  
 
The older industrial towns with highest claimant unemployment rates prior to the pandemic 
were Middlesbrough (9.0 per cent), Hartlepool (8.6 per cent), Wolverhampton (8.5 per cent) 
and South Tyneside (8.5 per cent).  Among the former coalfields, Northumberland (7.2 per 
cent) and Durham (6.2 per cent) recorded the highest unemployment on this measure.  
Among the main regional cities, the highest rate was in Birmingham (9.3 per cent), followed 
by Liverpool, Newcastle, Nottingham, Glasgow and Manchester, all with a claimant 
unemployment rate around 6.5 per cent.  
 
15 Up by around 450,000 from levels in 2016/17 because of the roll-out of Universal Credit, which has 
extended the scope of those required to look for work and included in the claimant count.  
16 The Labour Force Survey, which is a component part of the Annual Population Survey, uses the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition of unemployment which counts anyone who is out-
of -work, has looked for a job in the last four weeks and is available to start a job in the next two 




However, the numbers out-of-work on benefits extend much further than just those counted 
as claimant unemployed.  This is particularly the case in older industrial Britain where the 
main effect of job loss has often been to divert large numbers of working-age men and 
women onto incapacity benefits, in effect hiding unemployment17.  Across Britain as a whole, 
the numbers out-of-work on incapacity benefits peaked in the early 2000s at 2.7 million, 
compared to just 750,000 at the end of the 1970s.  Economic recovery and tightening 
eligibility then reduced the incapacity numbers but in February 2020, just prior to the 
coronavirus crisis, the headline GB total still stood at 2.3 million18. 
 
Incapacity benefit claimants, February 2020 
     (as % of working age pop.) 
 
 Former coalfields    7.9 
 Older industrial towns   7.7 
 Main regional cities    7.1 
 GB average     5.7 
 London     4.5 
 South East England    4.1 
 
 Sources: DWP, ONS 
 
The incapacity claimant rate in older industrial Britain remained much higher than the 
national average and almost double the level in South East England.  In older industrial 
towns 800,000 men and women, representing 7.7 per cent of all adults of working age, were 
out-of-work on incapacity benefits.  In the former coalfields 280,000 men and women of 
working age were out-of-work on incapacity benefits, an even higher claimant rate of 7.9 per 
cent. 
 
The very highest incapacity claimant rates in older industrial Britain were in Blaenau Gwent 
(12.4 per cent) and Neath Port Talbot (11.6 per cent), both in South Wales.  In the former 
South Wales coalfield as a whole – an area with a population of  three-quarters of a million – 
just over one-in-ten of all men and women between the ages of 16 and 64 were out-of-work 
on incapacity benefits. 
 
With the biggest job losses from industries such as coal and steel now receding into the 
past, few of these incapacity claimants will have been the redundant workers from older 
industries, who have mostly reached pension age.  More often they will be men and women 





17 See for example C Beatty and S Fothergill (2005) ‘The diversion from ‘unemployment’ to ‘sickness’ 
across British regions and districts’, Regional Studies, vol 39, pp. 837-854.  Also C Beatty and S 
Fothergill (2020) ‘The long shadow of job loss: Britain’s older industrial towns in the 21st century’, 
Frontiers in Sociology. 
18 Individuals claiming Employment and Support Allowance plus the number of households claiming 




Prior to the pandemic the overall numbers out-of-work on benefits19 were therefore 
substantial.  Across Britain as a whole, in February 2020, there were 3.8 million men and 
women in this group.  They included 1.27 million in older industrial towns, 430,000 in the 
former coalfields and 470,000 in the main regional cities – almost one-in eight of all working 
age adults in these parts of the country.  The out-of-work benefit claimant rate in these areas 
was almost double the level in South East England. 
 
   Overall out-of-work benefit claimant rate, February 2020 
   (as % of working age pop.) 
 
 Main regional cities    12.3 
 Older industrial towns   12.2 
 Former coalfields    12.2 
 GB average       9.4 
 London       8.4 
 South East England      6.8 
 
 Sources: DWP, ONS 
 
Most older industrial towns and former coalfields had an out-of-work benefit claimant rate of 
at least 10 per cent.  The highest rates were in Middlesbrough (17.3 per cent), Blaenau 
Gwent (17.3 per cent), Knowsley (16.4 per cent) and West Dunbartonshire (16.3 per cent).  
 
In addition, there is a further group of claimants who are in employment but on low income, 
for example because they work few hours, are poorly paid and/or have household 
dependents.  Universal Credit claimants who are in employment includes those who would 
formerly have received Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit or Housing Benefit.  
 
Universal Credit claimants in employment, February 2020 
   (as % of working age pop.) 
 
 Older industrial towns   2.9 
 Former coalfields    2.9 
 Main regional cities    2.5 
 GB average     2.5 
 London     2.4 
 South East England    2.0 
 
 Sources: DWP, ONS 
 
Once again, before the pandemic older industrial Britain had a claimant rate above the 
national average and much higher than South East England.  Additional in-work claimants in 
all areas will have continued to receive Tax Credits and Housing Benefit from claims that 










Before the pandemic: assessment 
 
Older industrial Britain should not be characterised as economically moribund.  Prior to the 
pandemic this substantial part of the country experienced job growth.  There had been real 
progress in bringing down unemployment since the financial crisis and, bearing in mind the 
scale of historic job losses, the unemployment rate was surprisingly modest. 
 
But this part of the country did lag badly behind.  Despite the fall in unemployment, large 
numbers remained out-of-work on benefits, especially incapacity benefits.  Productivity, 
measured by output per job, was some way behind the national average and earnings were 
below average.  In older industrial towns and the former coalfields job growth was also 
substantially slower than in the big cities. 
 
What is also clear is that older industrial towns and the former coalfields had an older and 
less healthy population that was always going to mean they would be especially exposed to 



















In the early part of the coronavirus crisis, including most of the first wave, confirmed 
infections represented a small proportion of the total.  This was because testing was limited 
mainly to patients in hospitals and therefore the majority of infections went unrecorded. 
 
In the second half of  2020 testing took place on a much larger scale over the whole country.  
Comparisons with data published by the Office for National Survey20, based on tests in a 
random sample of households, indicate that a substantial proportion of infections continue to 
go unrecorded but the gap between confirmed and total infections has unquestionably 
narrowed.  The numbers of confirmed infections in this later period, which covers the second 
wave, now swamp the much smaller earlier numbers so while data on the cumulative 
number of confirmed infections still falls well short of the actual number of infections there 
can be reasonable confidence that it broadly reflects the more recent incidence across local 
areas. 
 
Cumulative number of confirmed coronavirus infections per 100,000 residents 
    (as at 4 January 2021) 
 
 Main regional cities    5,120 
 Older industrial towns   4,850 
 London     4,730 
 Former coalfields*    4,530 
 UK average     4,060 
 South East England    3,430 
 
 Sources: HM Government, ONS 
 *Local authority-based definition 
 
Despite the surge in southern England triggered by the new variant of the virus, at the 
beginning of 2021 the cumulative total of confirmed infections per 100,000 residents in older 
industrial Britain remained 10-20 per cent above the national average and 30-50 per cent 
higher than the of the rate in South East England.  Nine of the ten UK local authorities with 
the highest rate of confirmed infections across the whole pandemic up to this point covered 
older industrial towns21.  The highest rate of all was in Merthyr Tydfil in South Wales, at 
9,200 confirmed cases per 100,000 residents. 
  
 
20 Office for National Statistics (2020 onwards, published weekly) Coronavirus (Covid-19) Infection 
Survey, ONS, London. 
21 Merthyr Tydfil, Blackburn with Darwen, Barnsley, Blaenau Gwent, Rhondda Cynon Taf, Oldham, 




Table 1: Cumulative number of confirmed coronavirus infections per 100,000 residents,  
as at 4 January 2021: selected district and unitary authorities 
 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL AREAS 
 
County Durham 4870 Barnsley  5190 Argyll & Bute  1050 
Darlington  4380 Bradford  6350 Clackmannanshire 2150 
Gateshead  4890 Calderdale  4770 Dumfries & Galloway 1150 
Hartlepool  6280 Doncaster  4920 Dundee  2850 
Middlesbrough  5340 Hull   5160 East Ayrshire  2830 
North Tyneside  4110 Kirklees  5300 East Dunbartonshire 2920 
Northumberland 3720 NE Lincolnshire 3900 East Lothian  1540 
Redcar & Cleveland 4220 North Lincolnshire 3690 East Renfrewshire 3020 
South Tyneside 5390 Rotherham  5280 Falkirk   1720 
Stockton on Tees 5100 Wakef ield  4820 Fife   1680 
Sunderland  5200     Inverclyde  1970 
    Amber Valley  4150 Midlothian  2060 
Allerdale  2460 Ashf ield  4160 North Ayrshire  2560 
Barrow in Furness 3760 Bassetlaw  4350 North Lanarkshire 3630 
Blackburn with Darwen 8160 Bolsover  4320 Renfrewshire  3390 
Bolton   6160 Chesterf ield  3450 South Ayrshire  2180 
Burnley  7480 Corby   2840 South Lanarkshire 3720 
Bury   6330 Erewash  3420 West Dunbartonshire 2850 
Chorley  4260 Gedling  4250 West Lothian  2380 
Copeland  2270 Mansf ield  3930  
Halton   5090 Newark & Sherwood 3500 Blaenau Gwent  7430 
Hyndburn  6160 NE Derbyshire  3780 Bridgend  6850 
Knowsley  6470 NW Leicestershire 3250 Caerphilly  5850 
Oldham  7260 S Derbyshire  4080 Carmarthenshire 4240 
Pendle   7080     Flintshire  3500 
Preston  6230 Cannock Chase 4090 Merthyr Tydfil  9200 
Rochdale  6860 Dudley   4820 Neath Port Talbot 6560 
Rossendale  5860 Newcastle under Lyme 5930 Newport  5470 
Salford   6150 N Warwickshire 4580 Powys   1940 
Sef ton   4890 Nuneaton & Bedworth 3930 Rhondda Cynon Taf  7370 
South Ribble  4300 Sandwell  5570 Swansea  5800 
St Helens  5290 Staf fs Moorlands 3800 Torfaen  5190 
Stockport  4540 Stoke on Trent  5220 Wrexham  5170 
Tameside  5420 Walsall   4900 
Traf ford  4680 Wolverhampton 5200 Dover   4690 
Warrington  5340  
Wigan   6140 Forest of Dean  2070 
Wirral   4250 
 
MAIN REGIONAL CITIES 
 
Birmingham  5130 Liverpool  5970 
Cardif f   5510 Manchester  6690 
Edinburgh  2000 Newcastle upon Tyne 5970 
Glasgow  3950 Nottingham  6230 
Leeds   5430 Shef field  5200 
 
LONDON  4730 
 
SE ENGLAND  3430 
 
UK   4060 
 
 




There has nevertheless been substantial variation in the confirmed infection rate, as Table 1 
shows.  Broadly, the cumulative rate up to the start of 2021 was highest in older industrial 
areas in the North East, North West, Yorkshire and South Wales and lower in Scotland.  
Among the main regional cities, the rate was more than three times higher in Manchester 
than in Edinburgh. 
 
These figures provide a snapshot at a point in time and as the pandemic evolves further the 
detailed pattern is likely to change.  There is nevertheless evidence here that, at least up 







There is no definitive number of deaths arising from the virus.  Three measures have 
regularly been deployed in the UK.  The first is the number of deaths recorded within 28 
days of a positive coronavirus test.  This gives the lowest overall count.  The second is the 
number of cases where coronavirus is mentioned on the death certificate.  This is generally 
around 10,000 higher.  The third is the number of excess deaths over the average for the 
time of year, which has tended to be a few thousand higher still. 
 
Here we use the first measure – the number of deaths within 28 days of a positive test – 
partly because local area data is available.  The figures we show are therefore at the lowest 
end of range but are likely to provide a reliable guide to the variat ion from place to place. 
 
Throughout the pandemic, coronavirus-related deaths have been better recorded than 
infections.  In the early stages, the death rate was especially high in London22.  In the 
second half of 2020, coronavirus-related deaths were more common in other parts of the 
country. 
 
Cumulative number of coronavirus deaths** per 100,000 residents 
       (as at 4 January 2021) 
 
 Former coalfields*    152 
 Older industrial towns   151 
 Main regional cities    123 
 UK average     113 
 London       98 
 South East England      92 
 
 Sources: HM Government, Public Health Wales, ONS 
 *Local authority-based definition 




22 Office for National Statistics (2020) Deaths involving Covid-19 by local area and socioeconomic 




Table 2: Cumulative number of coronavirus deaths** per 100,000 residents,  
as at 4 January 2021: selected district and unitary authorities 
 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL AREAS 
 
County Durham 171 Barnsley  231 Argyll & Bute    61 
Darlington  171 Bradford  145 Clackmannanshire   89 
Gateshead  158 Calderdale  101 Dumfries & Galloway   46 
Hartlepool  180 Doncaster  203 Dundee  104 
Middlesbrough  152 Hull   158 East Ayrshire    98 
North Tyneside  115 Kirklees  136 East Dunbartonshire 122 
Northumberland 133 NE Lincolnshire 130 East Lothian    66 
Redcar & Cleveland 137 North Lincolnshire 134 East Renfrewshire 116 
South Tyneside 202 Rotherham  214 Falkirk     70 
Stockton on Tees 153 Wakef ield  152 Fife     58 
Sunderland  197     Inverclyde    93 
    Amber Valley  137 Midlothian  131 
Allerdale  106 Ashf ield  136 North Ayrshire  111 
Barrow in Furness 173 Bassetlaw  140 North Lanarkshire 109 
Blackburn with Darwen 167 Bolsover  125 Renfrewshire  118 
Bolton   185 Chesterf ield    94 South Ayrshire  128 
Burnley  197 Corby   108 South Lanarkshire 128 
Bury   203 Erewash  145 West Dunbartonshire 126 
Chorley  146 Gedling  133 West Lothian  106 
Copeland  122 Mansf ield  112  
Halton   128 Newark & Sherwood 100 Blaenau Gwent  119* 
Hyndburn  152 NE Derbyshire  157 Bridgend  230* 
Knowsley  156 NW Leicestershire 123 Caerphilly  119* 
Oldham  193 S Derbyshire  137 Carmarthenshire   63* 
Pendle   174     Flintshire    85* 
Preston  161 Cannock Chase 157 Merthyr Tydfil  230* 
Rochdale  220 Dudley   138 Neath Port Talbot 145* 
Rossendale  127 Newcastle under Lyme 179 Newport  119* 
Salford   180 N Warwickshire 170 Powys     27* 
Sef ton   171 Nuneaton & Bedworth 159 Rhondda Cynon Taf  230* 
South Ribble  123 Sandwell  182 Swansea  145* 
St Helens  131 Staf fs Moorlands 187 Torfaen  119* 
Stockport  145 Stoke on Trent  182 Wrexham    85* 
Tameside  226 Walsall   172 
Traf ford  137 Wolverhampton 149 Dover   183 
Warrington  151  
Wigan   231 Forest of Dean    77 
Wirral   146 
 
MAIN REGIONAL CITIES 
 
Birmingham  142 Liverpool  159 
Cardif f     96* Manchester  129 
Edinburgh    68 Newcastle upon Tyne 106 
Glasgow  119 Nottingham  118 
Leeds   117 Shef field  137 
 
LONDON    98 
 
SE ENGLAND    92 
 
UK   113 
 
**Deaths within 28 days of a positive test.  *Welsh figures are the rate for the local Health Board  area. 




By the beginning of 2021, 75,000 deaths had been recorded across the UK within 28 days of 
a positive coronavirus test.  The number was once more beginning to increase quite quickly 
so again the figures here are a snapshot at a point in time. 
 
Over the whole pandemic up to the start of 2021 the death rate in older industrial towns and 
in the former coalfields – an average of just over 150 per 100,000 residents – was over 30 
per cent higher than the national average and over 50 per cent higher than in London and 
the South East of England.  Seven of the ten UK local authorities with the highest death rate 
at the start of January covered older industrial towns23.  The top five among these covered 
former coalfield areas.  Across the main regional cities as a whole the death rate was rather 
lower, though still 10 per cent above the national average. 
 
Table 2 shows that the averages again disguise substantial variation from place to place.  As 
with confirmed infections, the death rate in older industrial areas has been higher in parts of 
the North East, North West, Yorkshire and South Wales than in Scotland.  In a number of 
older industrial towns the cumulative death rate at the beginning of 2021 exceeded 200 per 
100,000, or around double the national average.  Across the country as a whole, deaths 
from all causes typically run at around 900 per 100,000 per year24 so in the worst-hit places 
the deaths arising from the virus have been a substantial addition. 
 
Quite why the death rate in older industrial towns and the former coalfields should have 
exceeded the national average by a bigger margin than the confirmed infection rate is 
unclear.  It seems unlikely that differences in the quality of healthcare will be the main 
explanation.  A lag between the surge in confirmed infections in southern England in late 
2020 and subsequent deaths may account for part of the gap.  There may also have been 
systematic under-recording of infections in parts of older industrial Britain, though the under-
recording was greatest very early in the pandemic when hospital admissions and deaths 
indicated that London was worst affected. 
 
The most likely explanation is that in older industrial towns and the former coalfields 
infections have been more likely to feed through to deaths because this part of Britain has a 
higher proportion of vulnerable people.  As we noted in section 2 of the report, the 
population here includes more old people and more with long-term health problems.  By way 
of contrast the main regional cities, which on average have experienced slightly higher 
infection rates but lower death rates, have a population structure that  includes fewer over-





23 Barnsley, Bridgend, Rhondda Cynon Taff, Merthyr Tydfil, Wigan, Tameside, Rochdale.  




Working from home 
 
The high rates of confirmed infections in much of older industrial Britain during 2020 require 
an explanation that only a detailed study going well beyond the present research could hope 
to provide.  However, several likely reasons are not diff icult to identify.  For example, as the 
pandemic has progressed the damaging influences of deprivation and of overcrowding have 
become clearer.  Some minority ethnic groups have been disproportionately impacted by the 
virus, even after adjusting for socio-economic factors25, and this is likely to have been an 
important factor in parts of Lancashire, West Yorkshire and the West Midlands where there 
is a substantial non-white population.  There has however been an unfortunate tendency to 
‘blame the victim’ – to argue that if infection rates are higher in some places this is because 
local people have not been ‘following the rules’. 
 
In practice, the limited opportunity for working from home is almost certainly a key reason 
why infections in older industrial Britain have been above average.  Working from home 
reduces contact with others and thereby limits transition of the virus.  ONS survey data from 
the first national lockdown, for example, shows that infection rates were up to three times 
higher among those who worked outside the home than among those working some or all 
the time at home26. 
 
Encouraging working from home has been central to the UK government’s containment 
strategy but doing so has not been possible for everyone.  Office staff typically f ind it easier 
to work from home than workers in factories, warehouses or on construction sites, and 
exposure to the virus has therefore varied by industry and occupation.  This matters in 
understanding what has happened in older industrial Britain because this part of the country 
has fewer office jobs and fewer white-collar workers. 
 
There is no local data on the proportion of the workforce that has been working at home and 
this will in any case have varied through time.  However, it is possible to estimate the share 
of the workforce likely to have had the option.  These estimates combine the local mix of 
occupations27 with ONS survey data on the proportion in each occupation who worked from 
home at some point during a reference week in April 2020, during the first national 
lockdown28. 
 
In older industrial towns and the former coalfields, the estimated share of the workforce able 
to work from home is on average ten percentage points lower than in London and seven 




25 Office for National Statistics (2020) Why have Black and South Asian people been hit hardest by 
COVID-19?, ONS, London. 
26 Office for National Statistics (2020) Coronavirus (Covid-19) Infection Survey, 12 June, ONS, 
London. 
27 APS data by place of residence for 2019, broken down into nine occupational groups.  





Estimated share (%) of residents in employment able to work from home 
 
 London     48 
 South East England    45 
 GB average     42 
 Main regional cities    42 
 Older industrial towns   38 
 Former coalfields*    38 
 
 Source: APS 
 *Local authority-based definition 
 
These estimates draw on working patterns at a stage in the pandemic when the pressure to 
work at home was greatest and refer to ‘working at home at some point in the week’ rather 
than continuously.  The proportions working from home will have been lower at other stages, 
not least as schools and colleges reopened.  Nevertheless, the estimates say much about 
the day-to-day experience of lockdown and the subsequent restrictions: whereas white-collar 
workers in London and elsewhere transferred from office to home, for almost two-thirds of 
the workforce in older industrial towns and the former coalfields this wasn’t an option.  
Additionally, some of those on low incomes in factories, warehouses, distribution and other 
non-office activities – a large group in older industrial Britain – are likely to have felt under 
moral or financial pressure to keep on going to work even at times when their own health or 
workplace safety has made this unwise. 
 
The higher proportion of office jobs in the main regional cities (particularly Edinburgh, the 
least ‘industrial’ of the group) means that the option of working from home has been more 
widespread than in the rest of older industrial Britain, though still well behind the level in 
London. 
 
The relatively low share of the workforce in older industrial towns able to work from home is 
underlined in Table 3.  Of the more than 100 local authorities listed here covering older 
industrial areas, only two exceed the estimated share in London (48 per cent), only four 
exceed the average for South East England (45 per cent), and only eight exceed the GB 
average (42 per cent).  In Bolsover and Corby, both in the East Midlands, the estimated 
share of the workforce able to work from home is as low as 30 and 28 per cent respectively.  
Both have relatively few white-collar office workers and large numbers employed in 
warehousing and logistics, a sector that has carried on throughout the crisis and largely 
requires on-site working. 
 
The differences from place to place in the extent to which working from home has been 
possible will have impacted on the pace at which infections spread in different parts of the 
country and helps explain why the rate of infections recorded in the summer and autumn of 
2020 proved to be so much higher in older industrial Britain.  The subsequent surge in 
recorded cases in London and the South East at the end of the year appears attributable to 






Table 3: Estimated share (%) of residents in employment able to work from home: 
selected district and unitary authorities 
 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL AREAS 
 
County Durham 37 Barnsley  34 Argyll & Bute  38 
Darlington  39 Bradford  35 Clackmannanshire 38 
Gateshead  38 Calderdale  43 Dumfries & Galloway 36 
Hartlepool  37 Doncaster  33 Dundee  38 
Middlesbrough  32 Hull   32 East Ayrshire  40 
North Tyneside  41 Kirklees  41 East Dunbartonshire 47 
Northumberland 41 NE Lincolnshire 32 East Lothian  43 
Redcar & Cleveland 34 North Lincolnshire 36 East Renfrewshire 51 
South Tyneside 40 Rotherham  39 Falkirk   38 
Stockton on Tees 38 Wakef ield  35 Fife   40 
Sunderland  36     Inverclyde  39 
    Amber Valley  40 Midlothian  40 
Allerdale  35 Ashf ield  49 North Ayrshire  36 
Barrow in Furness 36 Bassetlaw  32 North Lanarkshire 38 
Blackburn with Darwen 36 Bolsover  30 Renfrewshire  41 
Bolton   39 Chesterf ield  40 South Ayrshire  41 
Burnley  34 Corby   28 South Lanarkshire 40 
Bury   43 Erewash  40 West Dunbartonshire 37 
Chorley  39 Gedling  39 West Lothian  37 
Copeland  38 Mansf ield  35  
Halton   38 Newark & Sherwood 38 Blaenau Gwent  34 
Hyndburn  34 NE Derbyshire  42 Bridgend  38 
Knowsley  35 NW Leicestershire 43 Caerphilly  38 
Oldham  36 S Derbyshire  42 Carmarthenshire 37 
Pendle   35     Flintshire  39 
Preston  39 Cannock Chase 43 Merthyr Tydfil  35 
Rochdale  36 Dudley   39 Neath Port Talbot 35 
Rossendale  35 Newcastle under Lyme 42 Newport  39 
Salford   40 N Warwickshire 43 Powys   37 
Sef ton   40 Nuneaton & Bedworth 39 Rhondda Cynon Taf  37 
South Ribble  38 Sandwell  33 Swansea  41 
St Helens  38 Staf fs Moorlands 40 Torfaen  38 
Stockport  46 Stoke on Trent  32 Wrexham  37 
Tameside  36 Walsall   38 
Traf ford  50 Wolverhampton 35 Dover   39 
Warrington  43  
Wigan   38 Forest of Dean  37 
Wirral   41 
 
MAIN REGIONAL CITIES 
 
Birmingham  39 Liverpool  42 
Cardif f   46 Manchester  42 
Edinburgh  47 Newcastle upon Tyne 43 
Glasgow  42 Nottingham  36 
Leeds   42 Shef field  44 
 
LONDON  48 
 
SE ENGLAND  45 
 
UK   42 
 
 






The initial national lockdown in the spring of 2020 applied to all parts of the UK.  The 
restrictions were eased everywhere in the summer, though at a slightly different pace across 
the four nations. 
 
In the autumn new local restrictions on economic and social life were imposed to restrict the 
spread of the virus.  The rules in each of the four nations diverged and within England the 
government introduced a tiered system.  The map of local restrictions was never stable 
because new areas kept being added and others up-graded but, reflecting high rates of 
confirmed infections at the time, much of the North and Midlands of England, central 
Scotland and South Wales was the focus of the tightest controls. 
 
Thus immediately prior to England’s second national lockdown in November, 99 per cent of 
the population of Britain’s older industrial towns, 90 per cent of the population of the former 
coalfields, and all the main regional cities were subject to tight restrictions29:  This was at a 
stage when most of southern and eastern England outside London remained under the 
lowest restrictions.  In some parts of older industrial Britain, such as Greater Manchester and 
the Glasgow area, the higher-level restrictions had been in place for several weeks. 
 
A second national lockdown applied in England during November, followed by the re-
introduction of the tiered system and in December by still tougher restrictions starting in 
London, Essex and Kent and eventually extending to much of the rest of the country.  A third 
lockdown in England followed in January.  Wales moved in and out of lockdown and back 
again, while Scotland maintained tough restrictions across most areas and finally brought in 
a further lockdown. 
 
By the beginning of 2021 most of older industrial Britain had therefore endured long spells 
when the hospitality industry and much of retailing had been closed down.   Whilst many 
businesses in all parts of the country have been badly affected by the crisis, there is every 
reason to suppose that the duration and stringency of the restrictions in older industrial 
Britain will have caused especially severe damage.  Indeed, the UK government’s own 
assessment of the impact of the restrictions imposed following England’s second national 
lockdown notes that to the extent that restrictions are stricter “the short-term economic costs 
are likely to be greater”30. 
  
 
29 The f igures presented here are based on Tier 2 and 3 restrictions in England and their equivalents 
in Scotland and Wales, and on ONS mid-year population estimates for local authorities. 
30 HM Government (2020) Analysis of the health, economic and social effects of Covid-19 and the 




The public health crisis: assessment 
 
The coronavirus pandemic has hit older industrial Britain especially hard.  It was not obvious 
at the outset that this would be the case and in the first stages it was London that faced the 
worst of the heath crisis.  But over 2020 as a whole it was the cities, towns and smaller 
communities of older industrial Britain that on average experienced the highest rates of 
confirmed infection and the highest death rates. 
 
Quite why the virus impacted more on older industrial Britain than most other parts of the UK 
is unclear.  In time a full explanation may emerge though a number of key factors are 
already clear.  In particular, older industrial towns and the former coalfields have an older 
and less healthy population that was always likely to be at risk.  Deprivation too has been 
associated with vulnerability and there is no shortage of social and economic disadvantage 
in these parts of the country.  Additionally, the nature of the economy in much of older 
industrial Britain meant fewer opportunities to work from home and, as a result, greater day-















The policy response to the pandemic has led to multiple impacts on the economy and labour 
market of older industrial Britain, only some of which we are able to document here because 
in many cases the relevant data does not exist or is unavailable for local areas.  For 
example: 
 
• The crisis has led to a fall in turnover for many businesses, especially in closed-
down sectors, but ONS survey data does not provide local figures 
 
• Economic output fell precipitously during the first lockdown and is still well short of 
pre-pandemic levels, but local area data for 2020 will not be available until late in 
2021 
 
• The crisis has led to increases in personal debt among those whose incomes have 
fallen, but there is no local data 
 
• High Street footfall is lower, adding to previous pressures, but although local data is 
collected it is only available on a commercial basis 
 
• There have been more shop closures, but it is impossible to disentangle the effects 
of the crisis from on-going trends 
 
• Figures are collated on redundancies that have been announced but these provide 
no regional or local breakdown 
 
• Local data on the fall in the number of jobs during the crisis won’t be available until 
the autumn of 2021 
 
These and other consequences of the coronavirus crisis are very real and often very serious.  
Additionally, the crisis has widened inequalities between the high- and low-paid, between 
graduates and non-graduates, and between young and old31.  Here however we concentrate 
on the local labour market impacts that can presently be measured using official statistics.  
These cover the number of jobs furloughed, the rise in unemployment (including youth 
unemployment) and the increase in benefit claimant numbers.  Collectively, these provide a 
very useful guide. 
 
 
31 P Johnson, R Joyce and L Platt (2021) The IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities: a New Year’s 











As the crisis began, the UK government introduced the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme 
to temporarily pay 80 per cent32 of the wages, up to a ceiling of £2,500 a month, of 
employees furloughed as businesses closed down or reduced the scale of their operations.  
The scheme has subsequently been extended until the end of April 2021. 
 
The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme has been used extensively.  At peak, on 8 May 
2020, 8.9 million workers were furloughed on the scheme and by the end of June 2020 a 
cumulative total of 9.6 million jobs had been furloughed at some stage, accounting for 32 per 
cent of all eligible UK employees33.  Sector by sector, use of the scheme varied enormously 
reflecting the uneven impact of lockdown on different parts of the economy.  In this first part 
of the crisis up to June 2020: 
 
• 1.7 million employees in accommodation & food services, accounting for 77 per cent 
of the total, were furloughed on the scheme at some stage 
 
• 470,000 employees in arts, entertainment & recreation, accounting for 70 per cent of 
the total, were furloughed 
 
• 770,000 employees in construction, accounting for 60 per cent of the total, were 
furloughed 
 
• 1.9 million employees in retailing, wholesaling and the motor trade, accounting for 42 
per cent of the total, were furloughed 
 
By way of contrast: 
 
• Just 7 per cent (77,000) of employees in finance and insurance were furloughed 
 
• Just 2 per cent (20,000) of employees in public administration and defence were 
furloughed 
 
In manufacturing, which remains a large and important sector in much of older industrial 
Britain, 42 per cent of employees (just over 1 million workers) were furloughed. 
 
In this initial phase of the crisis the Job Retention Scheme had a huge impact on the 
economy and labour market in all parts of the UK.  However, older industrial towns, unlike 
say seaside towns, have never specialised in the hospitality sector and unlike the big cities 
they have never been major centres for arts and entertainment.  In older industrial towns the 




32 70 per cent in September, 60 per cent in October, restored to 80 per cent from November.  




Table 4: Cumulative number of jobs furloughed under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme 
(as % of eligible employments) as at 30 June 2020*: selected district and unitary authorities 
 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL AREAS 
 
County Durham 32 Barnsley  32 Argyll & Bute  31 
Darlington  30 Bradford  32 Clackmannanshire 31 
Gateshead  34 Calderdale  32 Dumfries & Galloway 30 
Hartlepool  30 Doncaster  32 Dundee  31 
Middlesbrough  28 Hull   32 East Ayrshire  32 
North Tyneside  29 Kirklees  34 East Dunbartonshire 28 
Northumberland 31 NE Lincolnshire 30 East Lothian  31 
Redcar & Cleveland 29 North Lincolnshire 28 East Renfrewshire 30 
South Tyneside 33 Rotherham  32 Falkirk   31 
Stockton on Tees 29 Wakef ield  31 Fife   29 
Sunderland  34     Inverclyde  26 
    Amber Valley  34 Midlothian  30 
Allerdale  36 Ashf ield  33 North Ayrshire  31 
Barrow in Furness 24 Bassetlaw  30 North Lanarkshire 33 
Blackburn with Darwen 33 Bolsover  32 Renfrewshire  33 
Bolton   33 Chesterf ield  32 South Ayrshire  34 
Burnley  35 Corby   30 South Lanarkshire 32 
Bury   32 Erewash  36 West Dunbartonshire 31 
Chorley  30 Gedling  31 West Lothian  31 
Copeland  25 Mansf ield  33  
Halton   29 Newark & Sherwood 31 Blaenau Gwent  30 
Hyndburn  34 NE Derbyshire  32 Bridgend  31 
Knowsley  31 NW Leicestershire 34 Caerphilly  29 
Oldham  32 S Derbyshire  33 Carmarthenshire 30 
Pendle   38     Flintshire  35 
Preston  28 Cannock Chase 38 Merthyr Tydfil  29 
Rochdale  31 Dudley   35 Neath Port Talbot 27 
Rossendale  32 Newcastle under Lyme 32 Newport  28 
Salford   34 N Warwickshire 35 Powys   31 
Sef ton   29 Nuneaton & Bedworth 32 Rhondda Cynon Taf  31 
South Ribble  29 Sandwell  35 Swansea  29 
St Helens  29 Staf fs Moorlands 35 Torfaen  30 
Stockport  31 Stoke on Trent  34 Wrexham  31 
Tameside  33 Walsall   35 
Traf ford  29 Wolverhampton 32 Dover   30 
Warrington  29  
Wigan   31 Forest of Dean  33 
Wirral   29 
 
MAIN REGIONAL CITIES 
 
Birmingham  35 Liverpool  32 
Cardif f   29 Manchester  33 
Edinburgh  30 Newcastle upon Tyne 32 
Glasgow  34 Nottingham  31 
Leeds   30 Shef field  29 
 
LONDON  32 
 
SE ENGLAND  30 
 
UK   32 
 
*claims received by 31 July 2020 




In fact, as Table 4 shows, in the initial phase of the crisis the use of the Job Retention 
Scheme in just about all parts of older industrial Britain was close to the national average – 
around a third of all employees were furloughed.  The figures refer to employees’ place of 
residence rather than place of work. 
 
Across the UK as a whole the take-up rates were highest in a number of tourist destinations 
– 42 per cent of employees in South Lakeland, 38 per cent in Blackpool and in Scarborough, 
and 37 per cent in Cornwall.  The lowest rates were mostly where a dominant large 
employer carried on working – 24 per cent in Cambridge (the university), 24 per cent in 
Barrow in Furness (the shipyard), 25 per cent in Copeland (Sellafield nuclear plant) and 27 
per cent in Neath Port Talbot (the steelworks).  The last three are part of what we define 
here as ‘older industrial Britain’ but they are the exceptions rather than the rule: on the 
whole, the share of jobs furloughed in older industrial Britain differed little f rom the national 
average. 
 
As restrictions eased during the summer of 2020 many employees began to return to work 
and the numbers supported by the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, which now required 
a financial contribution from employers, began to decline.  By the end of October just 2.4 
million employees remained on the scheme34.  Of these, 1.4 million were fully furloughed, 
and the remainder back at work but on reduced hours.  The furloughed workers still included 
24 per cent of all employees in arts, entertainment & recreation and 27 per cent of all 
employees in accommodation & food services. 
 
Table 5 shows the share of employees furloughed on the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme at the end of October 2020.  The figures are again by place of residence rather than 
place of work.  This was at a stage just before England’s second national lockdown, when 
the numbers were at a low point.  Most of England’s older industrial towns and former 
coalfields had furlough rates of 6-8 per cent, just below the national average.  In Scotland 
and Wales, where tougher restrictions were already in place, the rate was generally a little 
higher.  The furlough rate in London and a number of the main regional cities, at 10 per cent, 
was higher again. 
 
There is therefore evidence in the furlough data that as the UK economy recovered from the 
first lockdown older industrial towns and the former coalfields recovered a little faster than 
the big cities.  This is hardly surprising given the prominence of the hospitality, arts and 
entertainment industries in the economy of the cities, especially London, and the damage 
caused by the reduction in commuting by office workers.  On the other hand, these 
differences between places are modest compared to the huge rise and fall of numbers on 
the scheme. 
 
Later numbers are not yet available but England’s further national lockdowns and local 
restrictions and similar restrictions in the devolved nations can be expected to have boosted 
the numbers on the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme from November onwards. 
  
 
34 HMRC data for previous months suggests that the final numbers may be 3-400,000 higher as late 




Table 5: Jobs furloughed under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (as % of eligible 
employments) as at 31 October 2020*: selected district and unitary authorities 
 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL AREAS 
 
County Durham   6 Barnsley    6 Argyll & Bute    7 
Darlington    6 Bradford    8 Clackmannanshire   7 
Gateshead    8 Calderdale    7 Dumfries & Galloway   6 
Hartlepool    5 Doncaster    6 Dundee    7 
Middlesbrough    5 Hull     5 East Ayrshire    8 
North Tyneside    6 Kirklees    7 East Dunbartonshire   8 
Northumberland   7 NE Lincolnshire   5 East Lothian    8 
Redcar & Cleveland   5 North Lincolnshire   5 East Renfrewshire   9 
South Tyneside   7 Rotherham    7 Falkirk     7 
Stockton on Tees   5 Wakef ield    6 Fife     7 
Sunderland    6     Inverclyde    6 
    Amber Valley    6 Midlothian    8 
Allerdale    6 Ashf ield    6 North Ayrshire    7 
Barrow in Furness   5 Bassetlaw    6 North Lanarkshire   7 
Blackburn with Darwen   7 Bolsover    6 Renfrewshire    9 
Bolton     8 Chesterf ield    6 South Ayrshire    9 
Burnley    7 Corby     4 South Lanarkshire   8 
Bury     8 Erewash    7 West Dunbartonshire   7 
Chorley    7 Gedling    7 West Lothian    7 
Copeland    5 Mansf ield    6  
Halton     6 Newark & Sherwood   6 Blaenau Gwent    8 
Hyndburn    7 NE Derbyshire    6 Bridgend    9 
Knowsley    6 NW Leicestershire   7 Caerphilly    8 
Oldham    8 S Derbyshire    7 Carmarthenshire   9 
Pendle     8     Flintshire    9 
Preston    6 Cannock Chase   7 Merthyr Tydfil  10 
Rochdale    7 Dudley     7 Neath Port Talbot   8 
Rossendale    7 Newcastle under Lyme   6 Newport    9 
Salford     9 N Warwickshire   7 Powys     8 
Sef ton     7 Nuneaton & Bedworth   6 Rhondda Cynon Taf    9 
South Ribble    6 Sandwell    8 Swansea    9 
St Helens    6 Staf fs Moorlands   7 Torfaen    8 
Stockport    8 Stoke on Trent    6 Wrexham    8 
Tameside    7 Walsall     8 
Traf ford    8 Wolverhampton   7 Dover     6 
Warrington    7  
Wigan     7 Forest of Dean    7 
Wirral     7 
 
MAIN REGIONAL CITIES 
 
Birmingham    9 Liverpool    8 
Cardif f   10 Manchester  10 
Edinburgh  10 Newcastle upon Tyne   8 
Glasgow  10 Nottingham    7 
Leeds     7 Shef field    7 
 
LONDON  10 
 
SE ENGLAND    7 
 
UK     8 
 
*claims received by 30 November 2020 




The significant uncertainty is what will happen when the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme 
comes to an end.  Since the scheme is not now scheduled to be wound up until the end of 
April 2021 we will not know for certain until after that time.  However, with a vaccination 
programme then presumably well underway it is reasonable to assume that by that point the 
threat to public health will have eased allowing more of the economy to re-open, including 
the hard-hit hospitality, arts and entertainment sectors.  At that stage the recovery in London 
and in places dependent on tourism might be expected to catch up with the rest of the 
country. 
 
There is however no certainty that there will be a full and quick economic recovery.  Some of 
the jobs presently supported by the Job Retention Scheme may disappear when the scheme 
comes to an end because some firms may conclude that the jobs are simply no longer 
viable.  Quite how many jobs might fall into this category is unclear .  It is worth bearing in 
mind, however, that a proportion of furloughed staff are already back at work with reduced 
hours (this is allowed within the revised scheme) and that there is a financial cost to 
employers, who have to make national insurance and pension contributions, which suggests 
that they would not have furloughed staff unless they had reasonable expectations of 
eventually returning them to work. 
 
If one-third of the employees furloughed at the end of October35 were eventually to be made 
redundant that would result in an extra 900,000 job losses.  Coincidentally, the Office for 
Budget Responsibility predicts an increase in UK unemployment (measured using the ILO 
definition) from 4.8 per cent in September 2020 to 7.5 per cent in the second quarter of 
202136 – an increase of 900,000 – though in practice some of the increase is likely to arise 
from job losses unconnected with the Job Retention Scheme.  If the end of the scheme were 
indeed to result in redundancies on this scale and if the job losses were spread evenly 
across the country there would be: 
 
• 230,000 redundancies in Britain’s older industrial towns 
 
• 80,000 redundancies in the former coalfields 
 






Largely because of the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, the scale of the increase in 
unemployment during the crisis has been far less than would normally be expected in 
response to an economic downturn of the scale affecting the UK economy since the spring 
of 2020.  Even so, the increase in recorded unemployment has been considerable. 
 
35 Including an anticipated additional 300,000 late claims. 









Between February, immediately prior to the crisis, and November 2020, the latest month for 
which figures are available at the time of writing, the number of claimant unemployed 37 
across Great Britain more than doubled, from 1.2 million to over 2.5 million, an increase in 
the unemployment rate of 4.2 percentage points38. 
 
The increase in claimant unemployment is substantially more than the increase in the 
survey-based ILO measure of unemployment, which puts the GB figure for the three months 
to October 2020 (the most recent data at the time of writing) at 1.6 million, just over 300,000 
higher than for the three months to February.  Indeed, the claimant data points to 
unemployment that by late 2020 had already reached the level predicted by the Office for 
Budget Responsibility (which uses the ILO figures) for the second quarter of 2021.  If the 
further increase in unemployment predicted by the Office for Budget Responsibility in the 
first half of 2021 occurs, claimant unemployment looks set to exceed 3 million.  
 
Quite why the two official measures of unemployment have diverged remains unclear.  It 
may owe something to the very difficult labour market during the pandemic when vacancies 
in so many sectors and occupations have almost dried up, which may have deterred some 
unemployed claimants from even looking for work, thereby excluding them from the ILO 
measure of unemployment, which requires them to be active jobseekers.  
 
Older industrial Britain has been hit hard by this surge in claimant unemployment – between 
February and November the numbers rose by 310,000 in older industrial towns, 100,000 in 
the former coalfields and 140,000 in the main regional cities. 
 
           Increase in claimant unemployment, February-November 2020 
           no.  % point*     Rate (%*) Nov 2020 
 
 London      310,000     6.5  10.4 
 Main regional cities     140,000      5.1   11.1 
 GB average   1,350,000     4.2    8.1 
 Older industrial towns    310,000     3.9    9.1 
 South East England     170,000     3.8    6.4 
 Former coalfields     100,000     3.6    8.3 
 
 *% of economically active 16-64 year olds 
Sources: DWP, APS 
 
Taking the country as whole, the percentage point increase in claimant unemployment in 
older industrial towns and in the former coalfields was a little less than the national average.  
The percentage point increase in London, in particular, and in the main regional cities was 
larger.  On this key indicator, therefore, the labour market in all of older industrial Britain has 
been hit very hard but the downturn has been greatest in London and the big cities.  Area by 
area, in Table 6, the picture is of course more complex. 
  
 
37 Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants plus Universal Credit claimants required to look for work. 




Table 6: Percentage point increase in claimant unemployment*, February-November 2020: 
selected district and unitary authorities 
 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL AREAS 
 
County Durham 3.0 Barnsley  3.6 Argyll & Bute  3.3 
Darlington  2.7 Bradford  6.1 Clackmannanshire 3.0 
Gateshead  3.7 Calderdale  4.4 Dumfries & Galloway 2.4 
Hartlepool  3.3 Doncaster  4.6 Dundee  3.7 
Middlesbrough  5.8 Hull   4.9 East Ayrshire  3.6 
North Tyneside  3.3 Kirklees  4.0 East Dunbartonshire 2.8 
Northumberland 3.1 NE Lincolnshire 3.4 East Lothian  3.0 
Redcar & Cleveland 3.5 North Lincolnshire 3.0 East Renfrewshire 2.8 
South Tyneside 4.1 Rotherham  4.6 Falkirk   3.4 
Stockton on Tees 3.4 Wakef ield  3.6 Fife   3.3 
Sunderland  3.8     Inverclyde  2.2 
    Amber Valley  2.5 Midlothian  3.2 
Allerdale  2.1 Ashf ield  3.0 North Ayrshire  3.6 
Barrow in Furness 3.1 Bassetlaw  2.7 North Lanarkshire 3.7 
Blackburn with Darwen 4.6 Bolsover  3.1 Renfrewshire  3.6 
Bolton   5.1 Chesterf ield  3.2 South Ayrshire  3.6 
Burnley  4.7 Corby   3.2 South Lanarkshire 3.6 
Bury   4.4 Erewash  2.9 West Dunbartonshire 3.8 
Chorley  3.0 Gedling  2.8 West Lothian  3.2 
Copeland  2.2 Mansf ield  3.3  
Halton   3.8 Newark & Sherwood 2.9 Blaenau Gwent  3.7 
Hyndburn  4.2 NE Derbyshire  2.8 Bridgend  3.7 
Knowsley  5.2 NW Leicestershire 3.4 Caerphilly  3.7 
Oldham  6.2 S Derbyshire  2.6 Carmarthenshire 3.5 
Pendle   4.7     Flintshire  3.1 
Preston  3.8 Cannock Chase 3.5 Merthyr Tydfil  3.7 
Rochdale  5.4 Dudley   4.2 Neath Port Talbot 3.0 
Rossendale  4.0 Newcastle under Lyme 2.9 Newport  4.7 
Salford   5.5 N Warwickshire 3.8 Powys   3.4 
Sef ton   4.4 Nuneaton & Bedworth 4.1 Rhondda Cynon Taf  4.0 
South Ribble  2.6 Sandwell  6.0 Swansea  3.2 
St Helens  4.0 Staf fs Moorlands 2.6 Torfaen  3.5 
Stockport  3.9 Stoke on Trent  4.6 Wrexham  3.3 
Tameside  4.9 Walsall   5.2 
Traf ford  3.5 Wolverhampton 5.9 Dover   3.8 
Warrington  3.2  
Wigan   3.7 Forest of Dean  2.8 
Wirral   3.5 
 
MAIN REGIONAL CITIES 
 
Birmingham  6.4 Liverpool  5.9 
Cardif f   4.0 Manchester  6.3 
Edinburgh  4.1 Newcastle upon Tyne 4.5 
Glasgow  5.4 Nottingham  4.9 
Leeds   4.4 Shef field  4.1 
 
LONDON  6.5 
 
SE ENGLAND  3.8 
 
GB   4.2 
 
*% of economically active 16-64 year olds 




The high proportion of jobs in hard-hit sectors such as hospitality, arts and entertainment has 
almost certainly contributed to the large increase in claimant unemployment in London and 
to a lesser extent in the main regional cities.  Conversely, several of the former coalfields 
have come to specialise in warehousing and logistics, a sector that has largely carried on as 
normal.  As hospitality, arts and entertainment finally reopen the biggest positive impact can 
be expected to be on London and the big cities where there might therefore be a sharper 






Job opportunities for young people have been hit especially hard.  Recruitment has fallen 
away, partly for practical reasons and partly because businesses have been uncertain about 
the future, limiting the openings for those leaving school, college or university.  Over and 
above this, the industries that have been worst affected by coronavirus restrictions, such as 
hospitality and retailing, have traditionally employed large numbers of young people.  The 
effect has been to concentrate the labour market shock on young people, the low paid and 
those on insecure employment contracts39. 
 
Youth unemployment normally follows an annual cycle – peaking in the summer as young 
people leave full-time education and then falling away in subsequent months.  It is therefore 
best to compare the most recent data (for November 2020) with the figures for the same 
point a year earlier.  Over this period, across Britain as a whole claimant unemployment 
among young people more than doubled from 220,00 to 500,000, taking the rate to over 
seven per cent of all 16-24 year olds40. 
 
Increase in claimant unemployment among 16-24 yr. olds, Nov 2019-Nov 2020 
          no.  % point*      Rate (%*) Nov 2020 
 
 London     55,000      5.8  8.8 
 Former coalfields    22,000            4.1  9.0 
 Older industrial towns   69,000      4.1  8.9 
 GB average   279,000      4.1  7.3 
 South East England    37,000      3.9  6.1 
 Main regional cities    31,000      3.5  6.8 
 
*% of all 16-24 year olds 




39 M Brewer, N Cominetti, K Henehan, C McCurdy, R Sehmi and H Slaughter (2020) Jobs, Jobs. Jobs: 
evaluating the effects of the current economic crisis on the UK labour market, Resolution Foundation, 
London. 
40 Expressed as a percentage of economically active 16-24 year olds (i.e. excluding full-time students 
and others not employed or claimant unemployed) the rates are substantially higher: older industrial 
towns 13.9 per cent, former coalfields 13.8 per cent, main regional cities 14.8 per cent, London 17.0 




Table 7: Claimant unemployment rate among 16-24 yr. olds*, November 2020:  
selected district and unitary authorities 
 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL AREAS 
 
County Durham 7.7 Barnsley  9.2 Argyll & Bute  6.1 
Darlington  9.2 Bradford            11.2 Clackmannanshire 9.4 
Gateshead  9.1 Calderdale  9.8 Dumfries & Galloway 6.6 
Hartlepool            11.7 Doncaster            10.2 Dundee  7.2 
Middlesbrough            10.3 Hull   9.9 East Ayrshire            10.1 
North Tyneside  9.1 Kirklees  8.1 East Dunbartonshire 5.0 
Northumberland 9.1 NE Lincolnshire 9.9 East Lothian  6.5 
Redcar & Cleveland     10.0 North Lincolnshire 8.0 East Renfrewshire 4.7 
South Tyneside           11.7 Rotherham            10.0 Falkirk   8.1 
Stockton on Tees         10.3 Wakef ield  8.7 Fife   7.4 
Sunderland                   10.5     Inverclyde  7.9 
    Amber Valley  6.5 Midlothian  7.7 
Allerdale  6.4 Ashf ield  7.8 North Ayrshire            10.3 
Barrow in Furness 8.2 Bassetlaw  7.0 North Lanarkshire 8.1 
Blackburn with Darwen 9.3 Bolsover  6.7 Renfrewshire  7.6 
Bolton             10.4 Chesterf ield  8.3 South Ayrshire  9.0 
Burnley            11.5 Corby   8.3 South Lanarkshire 7.8 
Bury   9.5 Erewash  8.1 West Dunbartonshire   10.3 
Chorley  6.2 Gedling  7.6 West Lothian  7.6 
Copeland  6.4 Mansf ield  8.7  
Halton   9.3 Newark & Sherwood 6.8 Blaenau Gwent            10.0 
Hyndburn            10.3 NE Derbyshire  6.1 Bridgend  7.9 
Knowsley            11.6 NW Leicestershire 5.7 Caerphilly  9.0 
Oldham            11.3 S Derbyshire  5.2 Carmarthenshire 7.9 
Pendle   8.1     Flintshire  7.3 
Preston  6.2 Cannock Chase 8.2 Merthyr Tydfil  9.8 
Rochdale  9.9 Dudley             10.0 Neath Port Talbot 8.1 
Rossendale  9.0 Newcastle under Lyme 4.8 Newport            10.0 
Salford   8.8 N Warwickshire 6.9 Powys   5.8 
Sef ton   9.4 Nuneaton & Bedworth 8.8 Rhondda Cynon Taf  8.7 
South Ribble  6.3 Sandwell            11.7 Swansea  5.4 
St Helens            10.0 Staf fs Moorlands 4.9 Torfaen  9.4 
Stockport  8.2 Stoke on Trent  8.6 Wrexham  7.7 
Tameside            10.8 Walsall             10.8 
Traf ford  7.4 Wolverhampton           12.4 Dover   9.8 
Warrington  6.6  
Wigan   9.0 Forest of Dean  5.6 
Wirral   9.2 
 
MAIN REGIONAL CITIES 
 
Birmingham  9.6 Liverpool  7.4 
Cardif f   5.4 Manchester  7.1 
Edinburgh  4.6 Newcastle upon Tyne 5.3 
Glasgow  8.1 Nottingham  5.0 
Leeds   6.3 Shef field  5.6 
 
LONDON              8.8 
 
SE ENGLAND  6.1 
 
GB   7.3 
 
*% of all 16-24 year olds 




The increase in claimant unemployment among young people has been substantial in all 
parts of the country.  In older industrial towns it was almost 70,000 higher in November 2020 
than a year earlier, and in the former coalfields more than 20,0000 higher  – in both cases 
almost doubling – but as with overall claimant unemployment the biggest increase was in 
London, almost certainly because of the local importance of hard-hit sectors such as 
hospitality and retailing which normally employ large numbers of young people.  Again, 
therefore, at least some of the surge in youth unemployment in London might be expected to 
pass as the economy fully reopens. 
 
The claimant unemployment rate among 16-24 year olds, area by area, is shown in Table 7.  
In many parts of older industrial Britain the rate in November 2020 had already reached or 
was approaching 10 per cent. 
 
There is also substantial additional unemployment among young people who do not claim 
benefits, for example because they are looking for work but supported financially by parents 
or a partner or, in the case of 16 and 17 year olds, because they are normally ineligible for 
unemployment benefits.  Over the year to March 2020, prior to the pandemic, the Labour 
Force Survey recorded 485,000 unemployed aged 16-24, almost 250,000 more than the 
number on the claimant count.  No up-to-date local figures are available but these additional 
unemployed mean that the real rate of unemployment among 16-24 year olds, including 
those omitted from the claimant count, will be substantially higher than the figures shown in 




Overall out-of-work claimant rate 
 
Unemployment is just one component of the overall out-of-work benefit claimant rate, as we 
noted earlier.  Indeed, prior to the pandemic much higher numbers of working-age men and 
women in older industrial Britain were out-of-work on incapacity benefits. 
 
There is less reason to expect that the numbers on incapacity benefits will have surged to 
the same extent as the numbers of claimant unemployed, though if past experience is any 
guide persistent unemployment might well to lead to a longer-term diversion from one to the 
other.  Between February and November 202041 the scale and location of the increase in the 




41 Because of lags in the publication of some statistics the overall out-of-work benefit claimant data for 
November 2020 combines claimant unemployment (November), Employment and Support Allowance 
claimants (May), Incapacity Benefit claimants (May), Universal Credit claimants on the grounds of 




Table 8: Overall out-of-work benefit claimant rate*, November 2020: selected district and 
unitary authorities (as % of all 16-64 year olds) 
 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL AREAS 
 
County Durham 14.9 Barnsley  15.2 Argyll & Bute  12.8 
Darlington  14.2 Bradford  17.0 Clackmannanshire 16.2 
Gateshead  15.3 Calderdale  14.2 Dumfries & Galloway 13.6 
Hartlepool  18.5 Doncaster  15.3 Dundee  17.1 
Middlesbrough  21.2 Hull   19.5 East Ayrshire  17.0 
North Tyneside  13.3 Kirklees  13.4 East Dunbartonshire   9.6 
Northumberland 12.6 NE Lincolnshire 15.5 East Lothian  11.1 
Redcar & Cleveland 16.9 North Lincolnshire 12.1 East Renfrewshire   9.1 
South Tyneside 18.1 Rotherham  15.7 Falkirk   13.6 
Stockton on Tees 14.4 Wakef ield  14.4 Fife   14.0 
Sunderland  17.4     Inverclyde  18.3 
    Amber Valley  10.8 Midlothian  12.2 
Allerdale  11.8 Ashf ield  14.2 North Ayrshire  19.2 
Barrow in Furness 14.6 Bassetlaw  12.1 North Lanarkshire 16.6 
Blackburn with Darwen 17.3 Bolsover  13.5 Renfrewshire  15.3 
Bolton   17.0 Chesterf ield  14.4 South Ayrshire  15.7 
Burnley  18.8 Corby   12.5 South Lanarkshire 14.9 
Bury   14.4 Erewash  11.7 West Dunbartonshire 19.6 
Chorley  10.2 Gedling  11.0 West Lothian  13.7 
Copeland  12.5 Mansf ield  15.4  
Halton   16.0 Newark & Sherwood 11.1 Blaenau Gwent  20.2 
Hyndburn  17.6 NE Derbyshire  11.3 Bridgend  15.7 
Knowsley  20.8 NW Leicestershire   8.8 Caerphilly  17.0 
Oldham  17.6 S Derbyshire    8.6 Carmarthenshire 14.9 
Pendle   15.0     Flintshire  11.6 
Preston  14.5 Cannock Chase 11.8 Merthyr Tydfil  19.0 
Rochdale  17.8 Dudley   13.7 Neath Port Talbot 18.1 
Rossendale  14.1 Newcastle under Lyme 10.8 Newport  16.2 
Salford   17.1 N Warwickshire 10.1 Powys   11.2 
Sef ton   16.3 Nuneaton & Bedworth 13.1 Rhondda Cynon Taf  17.8 
South Ribble    9.9 Sandwell  17.7 Swansea  15.0 
St Helens  16.8 Staf fs Moorlands   9.1 Torfaen  16.3 
Stockport  12.6 Stoke on Trent  17.3 Wrexham  13.6 
Tameside  16.7 Walsall   16.6 
Traf ford  10.8 Wolverhampton 18.2 Dover   13.2 
Warrington  10.7  
Wigan   14.5 Forest of Dean  10.6 
Wirral   16.3 
 
MAIN REGIONAL CITIES 
 
Birmingham  18.5 Liverpool  19.5 
Cardif f   14.0 Manchester  17.2 
Edinburgh  10.6 Newcastle upon Tyne 14.2 
Glasgow  19.4 Nottingham  15.9 
Leeds   13.5 Shef field  13.1 
 
LONDON  11.8 
 
SE ENGLAND    9.9 
 
UK   12.6 
 
*% of all 16-64 year olds 




    Overall out-of-work benefit claimant rate* 
   % point increase, Feb-Nov 2020    Rate (%) Nov 2020 
 
 Main regional cities  3.6   15.9 
 Older industrial towns 3.1   15.3 
 Former coalfields  2.8   15.0 
 GB average   3.2   12.6 
 London   3.4   11.8 
 South East England  3.1     9.9 
 
 *% of all 16-64 year olds 
 Sources: DWP, APS  
 
The economic downturn has resulted in substantially higher numbers on out -of-work benefits 
but despite the surge in unemployment in London it has not fundamentally altered the 
country’s economic geography.  In the final part of 2020, some nine months into the 
pandemic, the overall number of working-age adults on out-of-work benefits remained 
especially high in older industrial Britain – 1.6m in older industrial towns, 530,000 in the 
former coalfields and 615,000 in the main regional cities – where they represented an 
average claimant rate of 15-16 per cent or nearly one-in-six of all 16-64 year olds.  Over the 
preceding nine months, the out-of-work claimant rate in older industrial Britain increased by 
almost a quarter. 
 
Table 8, which presents local data on the overall out-of-work benefit claimant rate, 
underlines the high level in most of older industrial Britain.  Virtually everywhere in older 
industrial Britain the rate now exceeds 10 per cent and in many places it is now at or close to 
20 per cent.  The highest rates in November 2020 were in Middlesbrough in North East 
England (21.2 per cent), followed by Knowsley in North West England (20.8 per cent) and 




In-work benefit claimants 
 
For many people who have remained in work the downturn has led to a loss of income.  For 
some on low incomes this has triggered eligibility for in-work benefits and, where one partner 
in a low-income household has lost their job, the other will often have become entitled to in-
work benefits. 
 
Between February and October 2020, the latest date for which figures are available at the 
time of writing, the number of in-work Universal Credit claimants more than doubled – up 
from 306,000 to 624,000 in older industrial towns, from 101,000 to 210,000 in the former 
coalfields, and from 98,000 to 214,000 in the main regional cities.  A small part of the 
increase will reflect the on-going transfer of in-work claimants to Universal Credit from 
preceding benefits but the big surge in numbers occurred in April and May, which points 




Table 9: Universal Credit claimants in employment, October 2020: selected district and unitary 
authorities (as % of all 16-64 year olds) 
 
OLDER INDUSTRIAL AREAS 
 
County Durham 5.4 Barnsley  6.2 Argyll & Bute  5.0 
Darlington  6.6 Bradford  6.0 Clackmannanshire 5.7 
Gateshead  6.1 Calderdale  5.9 Dumfries & Galloway 5.3 
Hartlepool  7.8 Doncaster  6.8 Dundee  5.8 
Middlesbrough  7.7 Hull   7.8 East Ayrshire  6.1 
North Tyneside  5.9 Kirklees  5.5 East Dunbartonshire 3.5 
Northumberland 5.2 NE Lincolnshire 7.2 East Lothian  5.0 
Redcar & Cleveland 6.1 North Lincolnshire 6.1 East Renfrewshire 3.1 
South Tyneside 6.8 Rotherham  5.8 Falkirk   5.0 
Stockton on Tees 5.7 Wakef ield  5.8 Fife   5.6 
Sunderland  6.6     Inverclyde  6.3 
    Amber Valley  4.8 Midlothian  6.0 
Allerdale  5.5 Ashf ield  5.7 North Ayrshire  6.2 
Barrow in Furness 5.3 Bassetlaw  6.0 North Lanarkshire 5.4 
Blackburn with Darwen 6.9 Bolsover  5.6 Renfrewshire  5.2 
Bolton   6.3 Chesterf ield  6.0 South Ayrshire  5.7 
Burnley  8.6 Corby   9.1 South Lanarkshire 5.2 
Bury   5.6 Erewash  6.2 West Dunbartonshire 5.9 
Chorley  4.9 Gedling  4.4 West Lothian  5.2 
Copeland  4.8 Mansf ield  6.9  
Halton   8.1 Newark & Sherwood 5.0 Blaenau Gwent  6.2 
Hyndburn  7.3 NE Derbyshire  4.5 Bridgend  5.5 
Knowsley  7.2 NW Leicestershire 4.5 Caerphilly  5.5 
Oldham  7.8 S Derbyshire  4.4 Carmarthenshire 4.8 
Pendle   6.2     Flintshire  5.9 
Preston  6.2 Cannock Chase 5.6 Merthyr Tydfil  6.1 
Rochdale  7.2 Dudley   5.8 Neath Port Talbot 5.5 
Rossendale  5.1 Newcastle under Lyme 4.4 Newport  6.8 
Salford   7.2 N Warwickshire 5.3 Powys   4.5 
Sef ton   5.8 Nuneaton & Bedworth 6.3 Rhondda Cynon Taf  4.8 
South Ribble  5.0 Sandwell  7.1 Swansea  5.2 
St Helens  5.9 Staf fs Moorlands 3.8 Torfaen  6.6 
Stockport  4.6 Stoke on Trent  6.9 Wrexham  6.3 
Tameside  7.0 Walsall   6.4 
Traf ford  4.8 Wolverhampton 7.6 Dover   5.7 
Warrington  5.6  
Wigan   6.0 Forest of Dean  4.7 
Wirral   6.0 
 
MAIN REGIONAL CITIES 
 
Birmingham  6.4 Liverpool  5.9 
Cardif f   4.9 Manchester  6.9 
Edinburgh  4.0 Newcastle upon Tyne 6.0 
Glasgow  5.3 Nottingham  5.8 
Leeds   5.2 Shef field  4.4 
 
LONDON  5.8 
 
SE ENGLAND  4.8 
 
UK   5.5 
 
 




         Universal Credit claimants in employment 
           % point increase, Feb-Oct 2020     % of working age pop. Oct 2020 
 
 Older industrial towns  3.1   6.0 
 Former coalfields   3.1   5.9 
 London    3.3   5.8 
 Main regional cities   3.0   5.5 
 GB average    3.0   5.5 
 South East England   2.8   4.8 
 
 Sources: DWP, APS 
 
In October 2020, some 6 per cent of all adults of working age in older industrial towns and 
the former coalfields were in-work but receiving Universal Credit as a top-up – a disturbing 
reflection of low household incomes and a huge increase since the start of the pandemic.  
 
Table 9 shows the local data on the proportion of the working age population receiving 
Universal Credit as an in-work top-up.  In Corby, a town originally developed to serve the 
local steelworks, over 9 per cent of all adults of working age were in employment but 
claiming Universal Credit as an income top-up.  In Burnley and in Halton (which covers 
Widnes) the proportion in-work on UC exceeded 8 per cent, and in Hartlepool, 




Economic and labour market impacts: assessment 
 
The economic downturn has had a major impact on older industrial Britain.  In effect, it has 
wiped out the labour market gains over the preceding ten years. 
 
As the crisis first took off around a third of all employees were furloughed and even as much 
of the economy began to reopen in the summer and early autumn of 2020 around one-in-
twelve of all eligible employees in older industrial Britain remained on the UK government’s 
Job Retention Scheme.  With further lockdowns, the proportion furloughed will have risen 
once more. 
 
Unemployment in older industrial Britain has risen sharply.  We noted earlier that between 
2010 and 2018, as the UK economy recovered from the financial crisis, claimant 
unemployment fell by 230,000 in older industrial towns, 80,000 in the former coalfields, and 
90,000 in the main regional cities.  Over the first nine months of the coronavirus crisis, 
between February and November 2020, the increases in claimant unemployment were: 
 
• 310,000 in older industrial towns 
 
• 100,000 in the former coalfields 
 





Following the introduction of Universal Credit, ‘claimant unemployment’ includes a wider 
group of men and women than was the case in the early 2010s but there is nevertheless 
clear evidence here that the progress in reducing unemployment that marked recovery from 
the financial crisis has already been wiped out.  There are probably additional increases in 
unemployment in the pipeline.  There are fears that as the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme comes to an end some of the jobs may not return and the Office for Budget 
Responsibility has predicted a further national increase in unemployment of 900,000 by the 
second quarter of 2021. 
 
Older industrial Britain is of course not alone in having been hit by rising unemployment.  
The increase has actually been somewhat larger in London, where the concentration of jobs 
in hard-hit sectors such as hospitality, arts and entertainment has dragged down the local 
economy.  However, the expectation must be that some of the increase in London will fall 
away as these sectors f inally re-open. 
 
Whether the increase in unemployment in older industrial Britain will fade away as the 
economy re-opens is unclear.  A recovery can be expected, driven in part by pent-up 
spending by household that have avoided a loss of income, but whether this will prove 
sufficient to offset the permanent closure of some businesses, the damage to the balance 
sheet of so many others and the pressure on public finances for a renewal of austerity 
remains to be seen. 
 
Nor has the pandemic overturned long-standing gaps in prosperity.  Older industrial Britain 
continues to have not only higher unemployment but also higher numbers on other out-of-
work benefits and on in-work benefits as well.  In this part of the country the economic 














There are four main conclusions from the evidence presented in this report.  
 
First, on a wide range of social and economic indicators older industrial Britain entered 
the coronavirus crisis lagging behind the rest of the country.  This disadvantage 
position was particularly marked for older industrial towns and the former coalfields: they 
started off with poorer health, fewer jobs, slower growth, lower productivity, lower earnings 
and higher numbers out-of-work on benefits.  The main regional cities occupy something of 
an intermediate position: they share many of the problems of older industrial Britain but over 
the seven or eight years preceding the pandemic they experienced strong job growth – 
faster than the national average, and much faster than in older industrial towns or the former 
coalfields. 
 
Second, over 2020 as a whole the public health crisis in older industrial Britain was on 
average worse than in the rest of the country.  Whether the scale of the crisis is 
measured in terms of the cumulative number of confirmed infections or deaths, up to the 
beginning of 2021 the cities, towns and smaller communities of older industrial Britain 
dominated the list of worst-hit places.  Until there is a full study the causes of this disturbing 
pattern will remain unclear but it is important not to fall into the trap of ‘blaming the victim’.  
Age, poor health and deprivation are known to be important factors in understanding the 
pandemic and, as the evidence presented here shows, the opportunities for working from 
home and thereby avoiding day-to-day exposure to the virus have been more limited in most 
of older industrial Britain than in London and the South East of England.  
 
Third, in older industrial Britain the economic and labour market damage resulting 
from the downturn has been substantial.  Very large numbers were furloughed in the first 
stages of the crisis and considerable numbers remain furloughed.  Unemployment has 
already risen substantially and there is the possibility of further increases as the Job 
Retention Scheme comes to an end.  In older industrial Britain the increase in claimant 
unemployment has already been greater than the reduction during the long recovery from 
the financial crisis.  In effect, in older industrial Britain ten years ’ progress has been wiped 
out. 
 
Fourth, because older industrial Britain was lagging behind before the crisis and has in 
common with so many other places been hit hard during the downturn, there must be an 
expectation that older industrial Britain will still lag behind most of the rest of the 






From a policy perspective this final conclusion – that older industrial Britain remains lagging 
behind – is arguably the most important.  In the weeks and months before the pandemic the 
UK government made much play of its intention to ‘level up’ the regions.  Older industrial 
Britain might reasonably have expected to be the prime beneficiary of this new priority.  This 
remains an expectation among the voters in the Midlands, North, Scotland and Wales who 
helped secure the Conservative’s general election victory in December 2019 and among 
newly-elected MPs from these areas. 
 
The coronavirus crisis has of course diverted much political attention.  A relatively benign 
national economic context – all be it with the details of Brexit then still to be determined – 
has been replaced by the steepest economic downturn of modern times.  There is a danger 
that the urgent need to deliver a national economic recovery will side-line the levelling up 
agenda. 
 
What the evidence in this report shows is that the problems of older industrial Britain have 
not gone away.  Indeed, they have been made substantially worse by the new economic 
downturn.  That there is a need to build a national economic recovery is indisputable, 






APPENDIX: Definition of areas 
 
 
Districts and unitary authorities included in ‘older industrial towns’ definition 
 
 
NORTH EAST   YORKSHIRE & HUMBER SCOTLAND 
County Durham  Barnsley   Clackmannanshire 
Darlington   Bradford   Dundee 
Gateshead   Calderdale   East Ayrshire 
Hartlepool   Doncaster   East Dunbartonshire 
Middlesbrough   Hull    East Lothian 
North Tyneside   Kirklees   East Renfrewshire 
Redcar & Cleveland  NE Lincolnshire  Falkirk 
South Tyneside  North Lincolnshire  Fife 
Stockton on Tees  Rotherham   Inverclyde 
Sunderland   Wakef ield   Midlothian 
        North Ayrshire 
        North Lanarkshire 
        Renfrewshire 
NORTH WEST   EAST MIDLANDS  South Lanarkshire 
Allerdale   Amber Valley   West Dunbartonshire 
Barrow in Furness  Ashf ield   West Lothian 
Blackburn with Darwen  Bassetlaw    
Bolton    Bolsover 
Burnley   Chesterf ield   WALES 
Bury    Corby    Blaenau Gwent 
Chorley   Erewash   Bridgend 
Copeland   Gedling   Caerphilly 
Halton    Mansf ield   Carmarthenshire 
Hyndburn   Newark & Sherwood  Flintshire 
Knowsley   NE Derbyshire   Merthyr Tydfil 
Oldham       Neath Port Talbot 
Pendle        Newport 
Preston   WEST MIDLANDS  Rhondda Cynon Taf  
Rochdale   Dudley    Swansea 
Rossendale   Newcastle under Lyme  Torfaen 
Salford    Sandwell   Wrexham 
Sef ton    Stoke on Trent 
South Ribble   Walsall 


















The map of the former coalfields is largely based on the wards where Census data showed 
that 10 per cent or more of the resident men in employment worked in the coal industry in 
1981, just prior to the largely final reduction in the industry’s workforce.   Where 
contemporary data is unavailable for Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) or datazones (in 
Scotland), for example from the government’s Annual Population Survey, the former 
coalfields have been matched to their principal constituent local authorities: 
 
 Northumberland:  Northumberland County 
 Durham:  Durham County, Sunderland, S Tyneside 
 Lancashire:   St Helens, Wigan 
 West Cumbria:  Allerdale, Copeland 
 Yorkshire:  Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham, Wakefield 
 Nottinghamshire: Ashf ield, Bassetlaw, Gedling, Mansfield, Newark & Sherwood 
 N Derbyshire:  Bolsover, Chesterfield, NE Derbyshire 
 S Derbys/NW Leics:  S Derbyshire, NW Leicestershire 
 N Staffordshire:  Newcastle-under-Lyme, Stoke-on-Trent 
 S Staf fordshire:  Cannock Chase 
 N Warwickshire:  Nuneaton & Bedworth, N Warwickshire 
 Kent:    Dover 
South Wales:  Blaenau Gwent, Caerphilly, Merthyr Tydfil, Neath Port Talbot, 
Rhondda Cynon Taf , Torfaen 
 North Wales:   Flintshire, Wrexham 
 Fife:    Fife, Clackmannanshire 
 Lothian:   Midlothian 
 Ayrshire/Lanarkshire:  E Ayrshire, N Lanarkshire, S Lanarkshire 
 
This match is imperfect.  For example, statistics for Northumberland as a whole are a poor 
guide to conditions in the former coalfield in the south-east corner of the county.  On the 
other hand, the statistics for the coalfields as a whole, defined in this way at local authority 
level, provide a tolerably reliable if still imprecise guide. 
 
Where statistics for the former coalfields are based on local authority data this is noted in the 
relevant table.  In all other cases the statistics are for the former coalfields defined at LSOA 
or datazone level. 
 
The coalfields cover a wider range of places than just pit villages.  This reflects the 
geography of mining, which took place in and around cities and towns such as Sunderland, 
South Shields, Wigan, Barnsley and Stoke on Trent as well as in smaller places.  
Additionally, the definition used here excludes a number of areas (in West Durham, the 
Forest of Dean and Somerset for example) where significant coalmining ended before the 
1980s. 
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